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The study of macroeconomic fluctuations assumes that the behavior of the 
whole (aggregates) cannot be reduced to the sum of the parts (agents, 
markets). This is because interdependencies between markets can substantially 
amplify, or on the contrary dampen, shocks that at any time disturb the equi-
librium. The understanding of general-equilibrium effects, on which direct 
evidence is limited, which are empirically blurred by multiple potential 
confounding factors, and for which controlled experiments are almost impos-
sible to design, is necessarily more conjectural than the study of individual 
behavior or of a specific market. However, ignoring these effects because they 
do not have the same degree of empirical certainty as a directly observed 
microeconomic effect can lead to serious policy mistakes.
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Business-cycle macroeconomics has been the subject of much crit-
icism in recent years, to the point that it is often perceived from the
outside as a field in an irremediable state of crisis1. I will focus here on
the criticism, or rather the cluster of criticisms, potentially the most
destructive, which consists of questioning the mere “scientificity” of
business-cycle macroeconomics, not only with regard to other sciences
(criticism which, whatever one thinks about it, is old) but in light of the
recent evolution of the economics itself, especially as regards its closer
relationship to data. There are two main sides to this general criticism:
1. See, for example, Reis (2017) or Romer (2016). Much of this criticism predates the Great
Recession, though the latter has contributed COMPLETE.Revue de l’OFCE, 157 (2018)
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achieved the “empirical turn” characteristic of mature disci-
plines, even though examples of such a turning point are
numerous in related fields such as labor economics, develop-
ment economics, as well as in many areas of microeconomics
such as industrial organization or corporate finance. Having
missed this empirical turn, business-cycle macroeconomics
would still consist of speculating on plausible causalities, conjec-
tures, imaginary worlds that are potentially far removed from the
one in which we live;
— Moreover, and this is partly a variation of the previous point, the
theory of macroeconomic fluctuations would face an almost
insurmountable problem of falsification: to the extent that too
few data is available to choose among too many macroeco-
nomic models, the stock of available models supposedly
accumulates without limit over time without any effective
sorting taking place. To borrow Noah Smith's expression,
macroeconomists would tend to “cover all the bases” (Buchanan
and Smith, 2016), demultiplying models and their associated
sets of assumption indefinitely, instead of selecting a small
number of relevant models.
These criticisms are severe, but are they truly justified? In any case,
they do not seem to take into account an essential dimension of the
study of fluctuations, which distinguishes it from other fields of
economics: the importance it attaches to the strategic interactions
between agents as well as to the general-equilibrium effects that take
place across different markets. This is what makes macroeconomics in
general, and business-cycle macroeconomics in particular, truly
special: it is based on the mere notion that the behavior of the whole
(macroeconomic aggregates) cannot be reduced to the sum of the
parts (the agents, the markets). This is because the various interde-
pendencies between agents and between markets can substantially
amplify, or on the contrary dampen, shocks that at any moment
disturb the equilibrium. The understanding of strategic interactions
and general equilibrium effects, on which direct evidence is limited,
which are empirically blurred by multiple potential confounding
factors, and for which controlled experiments are almost impossible to
design, is necessarily more conjectural than the study of individual
behavior or of a specific market. However, ignoring these interdepend-
ences on the grounds that we cannot reach about them the same
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mechanism would not only prevent us from understanding certain
complex and large-scale phenomena (such as the “Great Recession”),
but can also lead to misguided economic policy recommendations. In
what follows I develop these two points by relying on a critical discus-
sion of the recent literature.
1. Strategic Interactions and General Equilibrium Effects: 
Between Amplification and Dampening of Aggregate Shocks
In most cases, we do not observe a “macroeconomic shock” that
alone can explain the extent of an economic crisis. The Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s was preceded by a modest stock market crash, of
which no one could have anticipated the effects. The Great Recession
that followed the 2008 crisis followed a major financial shock but was
quickly contained by the concerted action of the major central banks;
this shock alone cannot explain the depth and duration of the Great
Recession, even in the United States. More generally, we do not have
direct evidence of large shocks along the business cycle that alone
could explain its amplitude. If production and employment vary so
much over the business cycle, it must be that the economic system
contains the seeds of its own instability, by amplifying the impact of
small disturbances. Such amplification mechanisms are difficult to
identify empirically because they generally involve several mechanisms
simultaneously set in motion and generate co-movements of all macro-
economic variables. Understanding such intricacies is usually
impossible without a fully specified general-equilibrium model, which
explains why business-cycle analysis gives a prevalence to macroeco-
nomic theory over a more inductive, empirical approach. Let me
illustrate this point using the main three propagation mechanisms that
have be argued to have contributed to the depth and duration of the
Great Recession.
1.1. The liquidity trap and the deflationary spiral 
The liquidity trap is defined as a situation in which the abundance of
reserve money within the banking system causes the nominal interest
rate on the interbank market to fall to the level of the interest rate on
the excess reserve that private banks hold on their account with the
central bank. This occurs precisely when the central bank is attempting
to implement the maximum level of monetary accommodation, so in a
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potentially slightly below) the rate of return on bank notes, namely
zero (abstracting from the cost of storing bank notes). At this point
“conventional” monetary policy becomes inoperative and any macroe-
conomic shock is magnified by the deflationary spiral depicted in
Chart 1: a falling aggregate demand depresses output and inflation; at
a given nominal interest rate, these deflationary pressures cause a rise
in the real interest rate, thereby reinforcing the initial fall in aggregate
demand, and so on. This feedback loop has been the subject of a large
literature since the pioneering contribution of Krugman (1998) and is
today one of the main explanatory model for the depth and duration of
the Great Recession in the United States and the euro area.2
The deflationary spiral depicted in Chart turns out to be particularly
difficult to directly measure empirically – far more than the effect of
limited disruption in a particular market. This spiral involves a number
underlying macroeconomic blocs (the Phillips curve, the Fisher rela-
tion, demand-determined output), each of which with its own
identification challenges. Given the inherent complexity of the
economic mechanism at work, attempts at empirically evaluating this
deflationary spiral have essentially adopted one of the following
approaches:
— The first approach is to test a specific implication of the propaga-
tion mechanism under consideration, which clearly distinguishes
Chart 1. The liquidity trap and the deflationary spiral
2. See, for exemple, Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), Christiano et al. (2015), and Gust et al.
(2015).
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context, the so-called paradox of toil (Eggertsson, 2010),
according to which negative supply shocks become expan-
sionary in a liquidity trap (because of their inflationary impact),
provides the needed crucial experiment.3 In this spirit, Wieland
(2017) rejects the liquidity trap hypothesis by showing that
negative productivity shocks (earthquakes, oil price shocks) are
contractionary even at the zero lower bound. In contrast, Datta
et al. (2017) find strong co-movements between oil and equity
returns at the zero lower bound, which is supportive of the
liquidity trap hypothesis. Even if the issue is not yet empirically
settled, it remains that the impact of supply shocks at the zero
lower bound provides a clean test of the feedback loop
described in Chart 1.
— The second approach is to specify a complete general-equilib-
rium model, in which the deflationary spiral mechanism is
present, and then to estimate it empirically (see, for example,
Christiano et al., 2015, Gust et al., 2017). This approach makes it
possible to measure the full causal chain postulated by the
theory and potential then to build alternative scenarios (“coun-
terfactuals”) which describe how the economy would have
behaved if this causal chain had been broken (say, if the bank
central could have implement very negative interest rates).
It is clear that in both cases economic theory plays a preponderant
role. In the first case, a complete dynamic general equilibrium model is
necessary to formulate a testable implication of the considered mecha-
nism; in the second, the full same model (potentially augmented with
addition features) is itself estimated on historical data. In any case the
deflationary spiral does not spontaneously show up in macroeconomic
time-series: it is primarily a theoretical construct and therefore, from
the outset, an interpretation of these time-series.
1.2. The precautionary-saving feedback loop 
A second amplification mechanism, which can play simultaneously
or independently of the previous one, involves the precautionary saving
3. Eggertsson (2010) introduced the paradox of toil by studying the impact of labor supply shocks
on equilibrium employment in a liquidity trap (he showed that a positive labor supply shock could
actually lower employment, due to the inflationary impact of the shock on nominal wages and
prices). Since then the same expression has been used to qualify the paradoxical effect of any supply
shock on output in a liquidity trap. 
Édouard Challe156behavior of households and the way in which it interacts with unem-
ployment risk over the business cycle. This spiral is summarized in
Chart 2. Intuitively, a fall in output that causes employment to fall back
raises households' precautionary savings (in anticipation of the
increased risk of unemployment); the induced fall in aggregate demand
reinforces the initial drop in output and employment, increases the risk
of unemployment, and so on. This spiral involves three basic mecha-
nisms. First, output must respond in one way or another to aggregate
demand (for example because nominal prices are sticky). Second,
labor-market flows and the unemployment risk that they generate must
respond endogenously to output changes; this requires a representa-
tion of the labor market in terms of worker flows (between employment
and unemployment) and not simply in terms of stock (employment).
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, households need to be imper-
fectly insured against the risk of unemployment – otherwise there
would be no precautionary motive in the first place and therefore no
time-variations in precautionary savings. These three mechanisms are
present in various forms, and thus generate the precautionary-saving
spiral, in the works of Challe et al. (2017), Chamley (2014), Den Haan et
al. (2017), Heathcote and Perri (2017), Ravn and Sterk (2017) and
Werning (2015), among others. 
Empirically measuring the feedback loop depicted in Chart 2 is,
again, challenging. Quantitative assessments of the precautionary-
saving spiral require from the outset the formulation of a complete
dynamic general-equilibrium model in which the three ingredients
Chart 2. The precautionary-saving feedback loop
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model, paying particular attention to the dynamics of the labor market.
Challe et al. (2017) propose a structural estimation of a related model in
order to evaluate the amplifying role of the precautionary motive
during the last three recessions in the United States. As far as I know,
there is no crucial experiment (of the kind of the paradox of toil in
models of the liquidity trap) that would make it possible to directly test
the existence of the precautionary-saving spiral: when one departs from
the structural estimation of the full general-equilibrium model, only
indirect evidence about a particular dimension of the loop is available
(relating, for example, to the effect of fluctuations in employment on
consumption demand). Thus, just as in the case of the liquidity trap, the
precautionary-savings spiral is a plausible propagation mechanism, the
amplitude of which can be measured in the data only through the lens of
a fully-specified general-equilibrium model. For this reason, the precau-
tionary-saving spiral is best understood a particular way of interpreting
the joint dynamics of aggregate demand and unemployment during a
recession, which can (and should), be confronted (and possibly associ-
ated) with alternative plausible amplification mechanisms. 
Note that the work on imperfect insurance and the precautionary
motive fully integrates individual heterogeneity into macroeconomic
dynamics, recognizing from the outset that different households (in
terms of wealth, income, labor market perspective etc.) behave differ-
ently, notably in terms of consumption and asset accumulation
choices. In particular, a typical result in this literature is that poorer
households (that is, households that are close to their own debt
constraint) have an individual consumption response to macroeco-
nomic shocks that is stronger than that of richer households, and
hence their presence is more likely to set in motion the precautionary-
saving feedback loop described in Chart 2. This approach makes it clear
that the amplitude of the business cycle and the level of inequalities
within a particular economy are fundamentally intertwined. For this
reason, this approach allows studying some important economic policy
issues that can not otherwise be addressed. Among those issues are the
aggregate demand effects of redistributive policies (through taxes or
unemployment insurance), which is the focus of the recent work of
McKay and Reis (2016, 2017).
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A third feedback loop, which is thought to have played an impor-
tant role in the propagation of the Great Recession, is the so-called
“credit cycle” depicted in Chart 3. The modern formulation of the
credit cycle dates back to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The theory was
later on operationalized into an estimated DSGE model by Iacoviello
(2005), who focused on the joint fluctuations of credit and house
prices. More recent contributions such as Jeanne and Korinek (2010)
have looked more closely at the welfare impact of the feedbackloop.
This line of works points out to the fact that fire-selling assets during a
crisis entails a negative externality, since the implied fall in asset prices
tends to tighten the credit constraints of all the other agents - thereby
making them more likely to also sell their own assets. As a conse-
quence, a benevolent policymaker may be willing to restrict agents'
borrowing ex ante in order to limit the risk of fire sale. This theory
provides one possible justification for imposing a “macroprudential”
regulation, in addition to the more traditional banking regulation.
1.4. General-equilibrium dampening of aggregate shocks 
The discussion above illustrates the fact that general-equilibrium
feedbacks can dramatically amplify the impact of “small” aggregate
shocks, and stresses that such feedbacks can only be measured in the
data by means of a theoretical model that incorporates them in the first
place. But it is worth stressing that general-equilibrium effects do not
necessarily manifest themselves through amplification: they can
Chart 3. The credit cycle
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naïve partial-equilibrium analysis (holding prices constant) could
suggest. To illustrate this, let us push the line of argument of Angeletos
(2018). Angeletos (2018) wonders what classes of models can ration-
alize the Keynesian narrative that low aggregate demand can depress
output. To frame the discussion in modern language, suppose that
individual consumers suddenly value current consumption less than
future consumption (say, marginal utility falls exogenously relative to
future marginal utility). Holding prices constant, and aggregating over
all consumers, this preference shock must translate into lower aggre-
gate consumption demand, hence it is indeed a “negative demand
shock”. In a partial equilibrium setting with constant prices, this would
translate into lower consumption. But prices cannot be considered
constant in general equilibrium. As stressed by Angeletos (2018), in a
Real Business Cycle model the drop in consumption generates an equal
rise in savings and a fall in the real interest rate that boosts investment
demand. Now let's take this reasoning one step further and assume
that output uses labor only, so that there is no demand for capital on
the part of firms. Still, if markets are complete households can poten-
tially trade bonds between themselves, instead of lending capital to
firms. But someone needs issue the bonds that the savers are willing to
purchase, and no household hit by a negative marginal utility shock is
willing to borrow. In general equilibrium, the (shadow) price of bonds
must fall until households are again happy consuming the very same
level of consumption that was planned before the marginal utility
shock occurred: general-equilibrium adjustments in relative prices have
completely eliminated the partial-equilibrium effect of the consump-
tion shock. Of course, aggregate demand and output may fall after a
consumption shock if prices are sticky and output is demand-deter-
mined; in this case actual output may fall below natural output, which
is formally equivalent to a rise in monopolistic distortions (Woodford,
2003). But here again, endogenous price adjustments, even muted,
tend to reduce the direct (partial-equilibrium) effect of the consump-
tion shock, except in the extreme case of constant nominal prices. 
To summarize, partial-equilibrium intuitions or empirical evidence
are uninformative about the likely effects of aggregate shocks, since we
should expect those shocks to be amplified (due to strategic comple-
mentarities and feedback effects) or buffered (due to endogenous price
adjustments) or both at once. 
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of Fiscal Multipliers
The importance of general-equilibrium effects implies that the
impact of alternative macroeconomic policies cannot generally be esti-
mated simply by extrapolating measures, however precise, based on
“small”, local policy shocks. The recent debates on the size of the fiscal
multipliers, and notably the government spending multiplier, illustrate
this point and deserve further discussion.
Formally, the government spending multiplier is defined as the
growth in GDP induced by an exogenous increase in government
spending scaled by GDP before the policy change. The empirical litera-
ture on this multiplier is considerable. Its main challenge is to measure
the causal effect that goes from public expenditure to output, while
many other mechanisms may affect the empirical correlation between
these two variables. To make this point clear, imagine that government
spending has no causal effect on output whatsoever. However, govern-
ment spending varies systematically with output since it is higher in
recession than in expansion (due to the automatic stabilizers), hence
there is a reverse causality going from output to government spending.
The endogenous response of government spending to output induces
a negative correlation between these variables that can be wrongly
attributed to a causal effect running from expenditure to ouput. In
practice causality goes both ways, and moreover a number of
confounding variables may correlate government spending and output
independently of any causal link. In this context, how can one isolate
the variations in government spending that are truly exogenous, in
order to measure their causal effect on output?
The recent empirical literature has mostly relied on two distinct
identification strategies to answer this question. The first strategy is to
focus on a particular type of government spending shocks that are
arguably not themselves caused by changes in GDP. The most
common way to proceed is to consider as exogenous shocks the
increase in military expenditure due to sudden, unanticipated deterio-
rations of the geopolitical context. These events generate variations in
public spending that do not depend on the business cycle (although
the cycle depends on it) and thus constitute in principle a valid basis for
measuring the public spending multiplier. The multipliers obtained
using this method vary between 0.8 and 1.2 for the United States (Hall,
2009, Ramey, 2016).
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spending to output relies on variations in local public expenditures to
average out their nation-wide component. The study by Suarez Serrato
and Wingender (2016) provides a particularly telling illustration of this
approach. Every ten years, the population of the United States is
counted, so that the recorded population of each county changes.
Following this, the federal government adjusts its financial allocation
to adjust to these demographic changes: the counties whose popula-
tion is revised upwards see their endowment increase, and those
whose population is re-evaluated downward see it decrease. Unsurpris-
ingly, this reallocation of federal funds between counties gives rise in
each county to a variation in local public expenditure. By construction,
these local variations are orthogonal to variations in US GDP as a whole
as well as to other economy-wide factors (e.g., monetary policy) that
are systematically related to GDP. Variations in local output generated
by local variations in public spending thus form a valid basis for
computing local spending multipliers. The authors find local multi-
pliers close to 2, thus significantly higher than those obtained using
macroeconomic data. The other studies adopting a similar approach
also find high values of the multiplier, around 1.5.4 In summary, the
empirical literature on the public spending multiplier gives (for the
United States):
— “nationals” multipliers between 0.8 and 1.2;
— “local” multipliers between 1.5 and 2.
From a strictly empirical point of view, the estimation of local multi-
pliers has two advantages over that of national multipliers. First, the
exploitation of geographical disparities in public expenditure elimi-
nates by construction any effect of the aggregate business cycle on
public expenditure, which in principle offers a more reliable identifica-
tion strategy than those based exclusively on macroeconomic data.
Second, local multipliers tend to be more precisely estimated, partly
because they make use of a much larger set of data.
One question that naturally arises is the reliability of these multi-
pliers in terms of macroeconomic policy. Indeed, by their very nature,
the spending shocks under study are of low amplitude, and partly
offset each other from one region to another. Therefore, it is unlikely
4. See, for example, Acconcia et al. (2014) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), as well as Fuchs-
Schuendeln and Hassand (2016) for a survey.
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rium effects of a large-scale shock at the level of a country as a whole.
These general-equilibrium effects of public spending shocks have
ambiguous consequences on the size of the multiplier: they can either
lessen the direct microeconomic effects of the shock (for example, if
the public expenditure shock is associated with a rise in the real interest
rate, which reduces private expenditure), or instead amplify them (if
for example one of the amplification mechanisms described in the
previous section are set in motion). For the reasons explained above,
we should expect both amplification and dampening effects to be
simultaneously at work, leading them to partly offset each other.
Unfortunately, this implies that local spending multipliers are of little
help, on their own, in assessing the likely effect of a macroeconomic
stimulus package – the ultimate question of interest.
Does this mean that local multipliers are of no interest to macroeco-
nomists? Not so. As shown by Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) even if
they do not directly inform us about the size of the aggregate multiplier,
local multipliers (which they more accurately refer to as the “open-
economy relative multipliers”) offer a powerful way of evaluating alter-
native macroeconomic models. For example, under the New Keynesian
model, the size of the economy-wide public spending multiplier is
conditional (like any fiscal policy) on the response of monetary policy: a
strict targeting of inflation can lead the central bank to raise the real
interest rate (via an increase in the path of policy rates) following a
government spending shock, with the effect of reducing the observed
fiscal multiplier; in contrast, a more accommodative monetary policy
response would reinforce the expansionary impact of the fiscal stimulus.
In as much as local multipliers are independent of economy-wide
monetary policy, the alternative models make unambiguous predictions
as to the size of their relative open-economy multipliers, which can then
be compared to their empirically estimated counterparts. Nakamura
and Steinsson show that this exercise leads to the rejection of the
neoclassical Real Business Cycle model in favor of the New Keynesian
model, which turns out to imply a much larger closed-economy aggre-
gate multiplier. Their analysis makes it clear that it needs a fully specified
macroeconomic model to turn estimated local multipliers into a policy-
relevant, economy-wide government spending multiplier. 
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In a letter to Harrod in 1938, in response to his presidential address
to the Royal Economic Society, Keynes discusses the nature of
economics in these terms:
“It seems to me that economics is a branch of logic, a way of
thinking; and that you do not repel sufficiently firmly attempts à
la Schulz to turn it into a pseudo-natural-science. [...] Economics
is a science of thinking in terms of models joined with the art of
choosing models which are relevant to the contemporary world”
(J.M. Keynes, Letter to Harrod, July 4, 1938). 
We cannot better summarize what remains an essential character-
istic of the study of business cycles and crises, namely the primacy of
economic theory over empirical analysis. This remains true today even
though the relationship between theory and data (and, more recently,
micro data) is much tighter than when Keynes wrote these lines. This
primacy of the theory makes the discipline necessarily more conjectural
than other fields of economics, because statistical inferences are always
conditional on relatively complex general-equilibrium models whose
relative performance is difficult to evaluate. This is not a lack of scienti-
ficity, but rather the way in which the scientific approach manifest itself
in this field of investigation.
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